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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW-PRICE DISCRIMINATION-PROOF 
AND MEASUREMENT OF DAMAGES IN TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS-
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act1 makes it unlawful for 
a seller to charge buyers who compete with each other different 
prices for commodities of like grade and quality. Price dis-
crimination which violates this section operates to confer an un-
lawful benefit upon a favored buyer by making his costs of ob-
taining, using, or reselling the particular commodities involved 
lower than the similar costs of non-favored buyers and puts non-
favored buyers at a competitive disadvantage to the extent that 
the difference in costs affects the ability of favored and non-favored 
buyers to compete with one another. If this wrongfully induced 
competitive disadvantage results in provable damage to the busi-
ness of a non-favored buyer, or if the discrimination otherwise 
causes provable damage to that buyer, section 4 of the Clayton 
Act enables him to recover three times the amount of damage 
proved.2 
This treble damage provision provides an extraordinary rem-
edy designed to encourage one injured by a violation of an anti-
trust law to prosecute his claim for damages sustained as a result 
of the violation by making it economically feasible for him to 
do so. 3 While this extraordinary remedy serves to encourage a 
1 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 13(a) (1958). Sections 2(d) and 2(e) 
make it unlawful to discriminate among purchasers in providing services or facilities or 
in providing payment for services or facilities. 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), as amended, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (1958). Insofar as such price-related discriminations affect the 
respective buyers' operating costs, reducing the costs of favored buyers relative to 
the costs of non-favored buyers, they operate to give a favored buyer a competitive 
advantage just as a price discrimination does. Insofar as this competitive advantage 
may lead to an infliction of damage on a non-favored buyer's business, these price-related 
discriminations are no different from ordinary price discriminations. Consequently, though 
the elements of violation involved under §§ 2(a), (d) and (e) may be quite different, treble 
damage cases arising under these sections can be considered interchangeable for most 
purposes in analyzing proof and measurement of damages in actions based on price or 
price-related discrimination. 
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
3 See Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954); Comment, 46 
CALIF. L. REv. 447 n.6 (1958). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides "That any person 
.•• injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws may sue therefor ... .'' 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). 
However, since the remedy is extraordinary, the language "any person ••• injured" has 
been strictly construed, and the availability of the remedy has been limited to persons 
who stand in some immediate or direct relationship to the violator. See Karseal Corp. v. 
Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955); Timberlake, The Legal Injury 
Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust 
Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231, 240-49 (1961); Comment, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 447 (1958). 
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respect for the law on the part of potential law breakers, its pri-
mary function in the context of each individual law suit is not 
the vindication of the public interest, but the assertion of a pri-
vate and individual right to compensation for injuries suffered.4 
The fact that a recovery is given of three times the amount of 
damage proved does not necessarily deprive an individual treble 
damage suit of its essentially compensatory nature, for the com-
plexity and prohibitive cost of such a suit require a generous 
recovery if the injured party is to be justified in risking the great 
expense of a suit and be compensated in any real sense of the 
word. Furthermore, the injury inflicted by a typical antitrust 
violation is of such a nature that its full extent may seldom (if 
ever) be possible to discover, let alone prove.5 
4 "The private-injunction action, like the treble-damage action under § 4 of the Act, 
supplements government enforcement of the antitrust laws; but it is the Attorney General 
and the United States district attorneys who are primarily charged by Congress with the 
duty of protecting the public interest under these laws. The Government seeks its 
injunctive remedies on behalf of the general public; the private plaintiff, though his 
remedy is made available pursuant to public policy as determined by Congress, may be 
expected to exercise it only when his personal interest v.ill be served." United States v. 
Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954). 
"The •.• Clayton Act afford[s] a cause of action for those suffering damages. In their 
provisions for damages they embody both punitive and compensatory damages but no 
recovery can be had unless a case for compensatory damages is made. In the event of 
compensatory damages, then automatically the punitive damages follow." Clark Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 14S F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945). 
"The conduct of Ascap [defendant] may be a public wrong for which penalties and 
other remedies are afforded the government under the statute. But no private right of 
action arises unless a plaintiff is injured in his property or business by the violations of 
Ascap." Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 
80 F. Supp. 888, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
Every tort action tends to vindicate the public interest in compensating the injured 
and in encouraging lawful and non-tortious conduct. The private antitrust treble damage 
action is, of course, a valuable aid in enforcing the antitrust laws, for its treble recovery 
feature encourages private ·vigilance and discourages violation. See Flintkote Co. v. 
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). See generally 
Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman Experience, 
30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181 (1961). The courts have repeatedly recognized this fact, but 
they have also recognized that the private action is primarily one to vindicate a private 
right to compensation, and that it is only when the private right has been established that 
the trebling or "punitive" feature of the action comes into play. Vindication of the public 
interest in policing violations is a strictly subordinate aspect of the indi'l-idual private 
treble damage suit. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., supra note 3, at 365; 
Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); Hess v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 20 F.R.D. 466, 475 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Standard Ultramarine 
&: Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937, 942 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. 
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
5 It has been suggested that the type of business harm inflicted by an antitrust viola-
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In any event, the courts have consistently and uniformly held 
that the basic cause of action in a treble damage suit is compen-
satory in nature,6 and that a plaintiff may not recover treble any 
amount until he has established actual damage sustained in the 
form of genuine economic loss to his business or property.7 Thus, 
courts have refused to award damages where the award would 
represent a windfall to the plaintiff, 8 and have required that a 
plaintiff take steps to mitigate his loss when a reasonable oppor-
tunity for doing so exists.9 In the latter instance recovery may be 
limited to the cost of mitigation so far as it would or did involve 
expense exceeding usual business expenses. 
The task of proving damages resulting from price discrimina-
tion has been a formidable one, however, and there has been 
considerable disagreement as to what constitutes compensable 
damage to non-favored buyers, how much a non-favored buyer 
must show to establish a claim for such damage, and how much 
of that required showing can be provided by proof of the fact 
and amount of a particular price (or price-related) discrimination. 
Some courts have indicated that "general damages" based on the 
tion is "accumulative," that intangible and unmeasurable harm accompanies the tangible 
and measurable (e.g., loss of steady customers resulting from a break in their buying 
habits), and that the ordinarily recoverable legal damages affords a definite base in 
proportion to which liquidated (treble) compensation for the additional intangible dam-
age can be awarded. Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or 
Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J. 117, 125, 128-29 (1940). 
6 See cases cited note 4 supra. 
7 See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, supra note 4, at 392; American Can Co. v. 
Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. 
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. 
American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); McWirter v. Monroe Calculating 
Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948). The words "business or property" arc 
used in the ordinary sense of a commercial venture or enterprise. Peller v. International 
Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 595-96 (7th Cir. 1955); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 
417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942); Broadcasters, Inc. v. Morristown Broadcasting Corp., 185 F. Supp. 
641, 644 (D.N.J. 1960); Image &: Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 
239 (D. Mass. 1956). 
8 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 54-55; Clark Oil 
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945). See also Bruce's Juices, 
Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 753 (1947). 
9 American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 55; Sun Cosmetic 
Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Strauss v. Victor 
Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 801-03 (2d Cir. 1924); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa.), afj'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960); Lowry v. Tile, Mantel &: Grate Ass'n, 106 Fed. 38, 47 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900), afj'd sub nom. Montague v. Lowry, 115 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), afj'd, 
193 U.S. 38 (1904). 
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amount of the discrimination may be awarded, on the ground 
that in particular cases such an award is a reasonably accurate 
reflection of actual pecuniary damage sustained by the non-favored 
buyer.10 Other courts have refused to permit such awards, on the 
ground that proof of price discrimination alone cannot prove 
actual damage to the non-favored buyer's business,11 and have 
required plaintiffs to prove "special damages" in the form of 
"lost profits" and depreciated value of the business as a going 
concern.12 After examining the principles which govern proof of 
damages in treble damage actions, the discussion which follows 
will analyze the types of loss or damage which a non-favored buyer 
can suffer as a result of price ( or price-related) discrimination by 
a seller, the way in which such loss can occur, and appropriate 
methods for proving and measuring that loss. 
I. ELEMENTS AND PRINCIPLES OF PROOF 
A plaintiff's cause of action for treble damages consists of four 
essential elements: (1) an antitrust violation; (2) the existence of 
actual damage to his business or property; (3) a proximate causal 
relationship between that damage and the defendant's unlawful 
acts; and (4) a basis for measuring or estimating the amount of 
that damage with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Proof of these 
four elements properly falls into three distinct stages as the second 
and third elements are established in the same stage.13 
10 "[The petitioner] would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory 
difference without proving more than the illegality of the prices. If the prices are illegally 
discriminatory, petitioner has been damaged, in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances, at least in the amount of that discrimination." Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American 
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947) (dictum). In Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass 
Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945), the court awarded "general 
damages" in the amount of a discrimination (difference) in allowances made to buyers for 
clerks' or demonstrators' salaries which violated §§ 2(d), (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
The court in American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 7, at 55, found 
that the plaintiff had not been damaged but added, "We do not doubt that, ordinarily, 
where a seller is guilty of unlawful discrimination in prices between customers, the 
amount of the price difference is the measure of damages ..•. " 
11 E.g., Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (amount of a price discrimination not a proper measure of 
damages); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1949) (amount of a price-related discrimination not a valid measure of damages). See also 
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 259. 
12 See cases cited notes 40-45 infra. 
13 See Timberlake, supra note 3, at 231 n.2. 
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A. The Violation 
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price dis-
crimination the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen 
competition ... , or to injure ... competition ... with customers 
[of any person who grants such discrimination] .... "14 This 
provision does not require that competition actually be lessened 
or injured before a violation can be found, but only that there 
be a "reasonable possibility" for the price discrimination to injure 
or substantially to lessen competition.15 Because a sufficient pos-
sibility of a "substantial lessening" of, or injury to, second-line 
competition will be inferred from the fact that a "substantial" 
price discrimination existed, and because a price discrimination is 
merely a price difference,16 a violation of section 2(a) can be es-
tablished simply by showing that a seller sold goods of like grade 
and quality in interstate commerce to competing customers at 
"substantially" different prices.17 
14 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added). 
For discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, see generally EDWARDS, THE PRICE DisCRIMI• 
NATION LAW (1959); RmVE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Am: (1962). 
15 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); Standard Motor Prods. v. FTC, 
265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Edelmann v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1957), 
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 51 (8th Cir. 1956) 
The Supreme Court had earlier indicated that a reasonable "probability" of an injury 
to competition was necessary. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945). 
16 FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 
supra note 15, at 45. 
17 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 15, at 46-47, 50-51; Standard Motor Prods. v. 
FTC, 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1959); Edelmann v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152, 154-55 (7th Cir. 
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43, 50-51 (8th 
Cir. 1956); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 
1960). Where a substantial price difference exists, the fact that individual buyers agree 
they have not been hurt by the discrimination is not considered necessarily inconsistent 
with a finding of a possibility or probability of injury to competition. Whitaker Cable 
Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253,255 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Edelmann 
v. FTC, supra at 155; Moog Indus. v. FTC, supra at 50-51. 
"To show injury in the secondary line, there is need only to show that the favored 
and disfavored customers were in competition with one another and that the amount 
of the price difference was substantial, either as a part of the sale price or as a part of 
the profit margin or in the aggregate saving that it made available to the favored custom-
ers. From substantiality in relation to sales price, the Commission can infer differences 
in resale price and diversion of trade or significant differences in operating profit. From 
substantiality in relation to operating margin, the Commission can infer an effect on 
profits. From substantiality in the total benefit obtained through discrimination, the 
Commission can infer a significant addition to the funds available for sales promotion, 
and consequent diversion of trade. It is not necessary to ascertain by examination of the 
facts that changes in business practice or diversion of trade actually occurred. Since the 
facts as to each commodity can be considered separately without regard to the importance 
of that commodity in the customer's total business, injury to competition among cus-
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The cases indicate that a "substantial" price difference is sim-
ply one which, in the context of a particular market situation, is 
not negligible.18 There apparently remains considerable disagree-
ment as to the amount of evidence necessary to establish that a 
price difference was "substantial," and as to the extent to which 
the trier of fact is required to inquire into the actual effect which 
a price difference may have (or have had) on the market. The 
quantum of evidence necessary will vary from case to case, of 
course, but it would appear that the burden is on the defendant 
to persuade the trier of fact that the price difference in question 
was so insignificant or insubstantial that second-line competition 
could not possibly ( or probably) have been "substantially lessened" 
or injured. At any rate, if a price difference is significant or sub-
stantial when compared with the resale price or profit on the item 
involved (or on the unit in which the item is incorporated), an 
appellate court without looking further will affirm a finding that 
injury to competition was sufficiently possible to establish a vio-
lation of section 2(a).19 
tomers may be discovered by inference, even when the commodity is so small a part of 
the customer's sales volume that the customer is aware of no injury.'' EnwARDs, op. cit. 
supra note 14, at 234. 
The burden is on the defendant to justify the price difference, if grounds for legal 
justification exist. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. Supp. § 13(b) (1961); FTC v. Morton 
Salt Co., supra note 15, at 44-45. 
'Where the violation charged is price discrimination in first-line competition (seller 
competing with seller) rather than in second-line competition (buyers competing with 
buyers who all purchase from seller who discriminates in price), a substantial lessening 
of, or injury to, competition will not be so readily inferred. There the possibility or 
probability of injury to competition must be shown. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra 
note 16. However, the Supreme Court took care to note: 
"Of course we do not depart from our holding in Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Morton 
Salt, ••• as to adequacy of proof of tendency to injure competition in cases involving dis-
crimination between purchasers. The instant case, as we have pointed out, involves 
differences in prices among competing sellers.'' Id. at 552 n.21. 
18 Com Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945); Edelmann v. FTC, supra note 
17, at 155; Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, supra note 17, at 256; Minneapolis-Honeywell 
Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 789, 792 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 
(1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); cf. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., supra 
note 15, at 49. 
"The substantiality of a price difference is to be shown through proof (1) that the 
price difference is large enough to affect significantly the buyer's profit margin in reselling, 
(2) that if the price difference were reflected in resale prices it would significantly affect 
the buying decisions of customers in resale markets, or (3) that the price difference pro-
vides, for the favored buyer, an aggregate saving large enough to be used for significant 
business purposes. Where the discrimination is substantial by any of these tests, an 
inference that the discrimination is injurious to the class of customers that does not 
receive it is thought to be inescapable.'' EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 532. 
10 See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 
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Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act make it 
unlawful for a seller to pay for or to provide services or facilities 
to customers in connection with the sale of commodities to those 
customers, except on proportionately equal terms.20 A discrimi-
nation in violation of these sections is per se unlawful and no 
effect on competition need be shown.21 
B. The Fact and Amount of Damage 
Having established the violation, a plaintiff must next estab-
lish the existence of actual damage proximately caused by the 
defendant's violation, and its amount.22 
The identification of three distinct elements in proof of 
damage ( existence, causation and amount) which are to be estab-
lished in two stages, and the grouping of proof of existence and 
causation together as one stage which is differentiated from proof 
of amount, may at first appear artificial. After all, proof of an 
amount of damage necessarily establishes the existence of that 
damage. Further, even if it is shown that defendant's acts caused 
a loss to plaintiff, specific amounts of loss claimed must be shown 
to have been part of that loss which was caused by defendant. 
Thus, proof of causation seems a necessary part of proving amount, 
and proof of the existence of damage hardly seems a separate 
requirement, especially where virtually the same evidence is used 
to establish all three elements. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
proof of the fact of damage (existence and causation) and meas-
supra note 15, at 46. For discussion of proof of competitive effect under § 2(a) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, see generally EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 223-36, 531-45; 
RowE, op cit. supra note 14, at chs. 6, 8; Arr'Y. GEN. NAT'L Coi.n,1. ANTITRUST REP. 
160-70; Kalinowski, Price Discrimination and Competitive Effects, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST 
SECTION 382-86 (1960); Rowe, Borderland Issues, A.B.A. Antitrust Section 60-72 (April 
5-6, 1956); Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1597 (1961). 
20 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d), (e) (Supp. 1961). See generally Comment, 29 
U. CHI. L. REv. 160 (1961). 
21 See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959) (dictum); State Wholesale 
Grocers v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1958); Sun Cosmetic 
Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1949); Elizabeth Arden 
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 994-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 
(1945). 
22 For general discussion of proof of damages in private treble damage suits, see 
Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust 
Suits, 52 MICH. L. Rev. 363 (1954); Timberlake, supra note 3; Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 
130, 131 (1950); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1022-27 (1952). 
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urement of the amount of damage may be only a single step 
rather than a two-step process.23 
In fact, however, there are good reasons for maintaining a 
distinction between proving the existence of compensable loss and 
proving the amount of damages.24 A treble damage plaintiff can-
not always prove specific and individually identifiable items of 
loss, each readily measurable. Frequently he will be forced to 
seek recovery for a general or overall loss, and in such cases the 
amount of loss cannot usually be proved with a great degree of 
exactness.25 Who can prove exactly how many sales he would have 
made and at what profit, but for an unlawful advantage given his 
competitor? 
If the plaintiff did lose some sales because of an unlawful 
advantage given his competitor, or sustained some other form of 
damage, however, the fact that some such loss did occur,26 and 
that it was caused by the defendant's acts,27 can usually be per-
23 See Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd 
on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); Clark, supra note 22, at 374-75. 
24. See Timberlake, supra note 3, at 232, 240. 
25 This is true in any case where the plaintiff sues for a general loss of sales. The 
"movie cases" are good examples. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 
(1946); Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951); Bordonaro Bros. 
Theaters v. Paramount Pictures, 176 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1949). See also Enterprise Indus. v. 
The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). 
26 Financial records are generally essential, however. See, e.g., Enterprise Indus. v. 
The Tex. Co., supra note 25, at 458-59; Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Seigfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 193 F. Supp. 
427, 436-37 (W.D. Mo. 1961), afj'd, 298 F.2d I, 6-8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819 
(1962). 
27 Proof of causation must generally be made with circumstantial evidence and the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. E.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block 8: Gravel 
Co., 269 F. 2d 950, 957-58 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Sano Petroleum 
Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Momand v. Universal 
Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469, 482 (D. Mass. 1947), afj'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948); 
Lowry v. Tile, Mantel 8: Gravel Co., 106 Fed. 38, 46 (C.C.N.D. Calif. 1900), aff'd sub nom. 
Montague v. Lowry, 115 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1902), aff'd, 193 U.S. 38 (1904). The fact that 
in a given case the amount of the discrimination was substantial as compared with the 
plaintiff's operating costs will be persuasive evidence as to causation, American Can Co. 
v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 
(1931); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 
187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951), especially when coupled with other evidence such as customer 
testimony to the effect that the favored competitor's lower prices induced the customers 
to buy from the competitor rather than from the plaintiff. American Can Co. v. Ladoga 
Canning Co., supra at 768-69. Such evidence may alone be sufficient to establish causation, 
absent a showing to the contrary. See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 
712-13 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit 
Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F,2d 790 (2d Cir. 
1959). The burden is on the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's showing of causation once 
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suasively shown. Furthermore, it must be persuasively shown. 
The treble damage action being essentially compensatory, a plain-
tiff is required to prove the existence of such actual economic 
loss caused by the defendant's acts before a treble damage recov-
ery can be awarded.28 It is here that the "actual damage" re-
quirement exerts its influence. A court may not speculate as to 
whether an antitrust violation may have injured a particular plain-
tiff, and the fact of actual loss may not be inferred simply from 
the fact that a price discrimination existed, for a price discrimina-
tion will not always and inevitably cause such a loss to one who 
does not receive its benefit as the subsequent analysis of the types 
of damage and how they occur will indicate.20 
a persuasive showing has been made. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 
264 (1946); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., supra at 988. If the defendant can show 
that plaintiff's losses were due to other causes, plaintiff is not entitled to recover. See 
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &: Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 77215, 
77238-39 (9th Cir. 1960); Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra at 
957-58; Prentice Mach. Co. v. Associated Plywood Mills, 252 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 356 U.S. 951 (1958); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., supra at 770; Mc-
Wirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 462-63, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948). 
Plaintiff can recover, however, if defendant's violations were the most substantial cause of 
the plaintiff's losses. See Riss &: Co. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 1960 Trade Cas. 76873, 
76877 (D.D.C. 1960); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., supra at 482. See generally 
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 234-40; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1016-19 (1952). 
28 See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &: Smith Citrus Prods. Co., supra note 27, at 
77240; Talon, Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 75260, 75262 (9th Cir. 
1959); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 
(1957); Peller v. International Boxing Club, 227 F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955); American Can 
Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. 
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949); Momand v. Universal Films 
Exchs., 172 F.2d 37, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1948); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th 
Cir. 1942); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 
1960); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D. Ore. 1958); McWirter 
v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 465 (W.D. Mo. 1948). 
29 In Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1962), the court said: 
"The trial court very correctly stated [that the] 'gist of a private treble-damage action 
is not the violation of the antitrust laws, as such, but is the allegation of facts from which 
it may be inferred that a party plaintiff was caused direct injury to his business or 
property as a result of such violation • • • .' " 
In American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., supra note 28, at 54, the court said: 
"It is our understanding that, in order for a plaintiff to recover damages ••. , it is not 
enough to show that a defendant was guilty of price discriminations which might lessen 
or injure competition, but it is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the wrong 
done proximately resulted in ascertainable damage to its business and property.'' 
In Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., supra note 28, at 353, the court said: 
"In this Circuit [Second], proof of discrimination in price establishes a prima facie case 
that the discrimination is one proscribed by section 2(a) so as to shift to the defendant 
the burden of proving that the discrimination is not proscribed. • • • But there is no 
presumption that the proscribed discrimination in price has caused damage to the 
plaintiff. The burden of proving such damage is always on the plaintiff.'' See also Herman 
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1962); authorities 
cited note 11 supra. 
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Once the existence of actual economic loss caused by defend-
ant's acts has been established, the plaintiff must still measure 
the amount of his loss. It is one thing to prove that some sales were 
lost to a competitor, however, and quite another to prove the 
amount of profit that would have been made had the sales not 
been lost. In the early days of the treble damage action, stringent 
proof requirements as to the amount of damage tended to defeat 
recoveries even where there was no doubt that the plaintiff had 
suffered substantial economic loss as a result of the defendant's 
antitrust violation, for as a practical matter it was (and is) almost 
impossible to determine exactly the amount of loss in a given 
case.30 Practicality necessitated a less exacting requirement of 
proof as to the amount of damage; and because the plaintiff's 
inability to prove with precision what his profit would have been 
absent the defendant's wrongdoing was, after all, the result of the 
defendant's wrongdoing, it was only equitable that the plaintiff 
should be permitted to estimate in a reasonable manner the 
amount of his loss.31 The amount of damage may thus be esti-
mated from relevant data which is sufficient to make the estimate 
reasonably accurate.32 This does not mean that the amount of 
the damage award may be based on speculation or guesswork, 
however;33 though proof requirements for measuring or valuing 
the amount of damage are relaxed once the fact of damage has 
been established, this relaxation is intended to eliminate impos-
sible proof requirements, not to make proof of amount unnec-
essary.34 
Even where the same evidence is used to prove both the fact 
and the amount of damage, the distinction between the two stages 
30 Clark, supra note 22, at 367-69. 
31 See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Story Parchment 
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927). 
32 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra note 31, at 264-66; Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., supra note 31, at 563; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern 
Photo Materials Co., supra note 31, at 379; Talon, Inc. v. Union Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959 
Trade Cas. 75260, 75262 (9th Cir. 1959). 
33 Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, supra note 31, at 264; Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Southern Photo Materials Co., supra note 31, at 379. 
34 See Siegfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 298 F.2d 1, 7-8 (8th Cir.), affirming 193 F. 
Supp. 427, 431-34, 436, 438 (W.D. Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819 (1962); Herman 
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10, 912-15 (2d Cir. 1962); 
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods., 1960 Trade Cas. 77215, 77241 
(9th Cir. 1960); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 
U.S. 835 (1957). 
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of proof must be kept clear in order to preserve their qualitative 
differences.35 The fact that the amount of damages may be esti-
mated must not be misconstrued so as to destroy the requirement 
that a treble damage plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves with 
certainty the existence of actual economic loss caused by the de-
fendant's unlawful acts. 
Proof of the existence of damage caused by defendant's viola-
tion, the second stage in a plaintiff's proof, must of course be 
clearly distinguished from the first stage in which he proves the 
violation. There, as we have seen, the requisite possibility of a 
"substantial lessening" of or "injury" to competition under sec-
tion 2(a) can be inferred from the existence of a substantial price 
discrimination without further proof,36 and the furnishing of or 
paying for services or facilities for purchasers on terms not pro-
portionately equal is per se unlawful under sections 2(d) and (e).37 
A finding of damage to an individual plaintiff may not rest upon 
a generalized finding of a possibility of injury to competition nor 
upon the fact that the discrimination was per se unlawful. A 
finding of "damage" must rest upon a specific finding of economic 
loss suffered by that plaintiff and caused by the defendant's un-
lawful acts. 
At the same time the fact and the amount of a price or price-
related discrimination may be a very important part of a plain-
tiff's proof; while it cannot establish the existence of damage, it 
can be persuasive proof of causation.38 In the usual case the fact 
that the discrimination complained of was substantial when viewed 
35 In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 
(1931), the Court said: "It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the 
damage, but there was none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction 
between the measure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained 
some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. 
The rule which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as arc not 
the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable 
to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount." 
In Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, supra note 34, at 392, the court said: "The cases have 
drawn a distinction between the quantum of proof necessary to show the fact as dis-
tinguished from the amount of damage; the burden as to the former is the more strin-
gent one. In other words, the fact of injury must first be shown before the jury is allowed 
to estimate the amount of damage." 
See also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods., supra note 34, at 
77240; Talon, Inc. v. United Slide Fastener, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 75260 (9th Cir. 1959). 
36 See cases cited note 17 supra. 
37 See authorities cited notes 20, 21 supra. 
38 See cases on proving causation cited note 27 supra. 
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in the market situation will not be the only evidence tending 
to show causation, but in every case where such a showing can 
be made it will be important evidence on the causation question 
once the existence of actual loss has been demonstrated. 
II. THE NATURE OF DAMAGE AND APPLICATION 
OF PRINCIPLES OF PROOF 
A. Indirect or Consequential Damage 
A non-favored buyer can suffer damage as a direct or as an 
indirect result of a seller's price discrimination. Because the 
nature of the causal relationship between violation and damage 
has an important bearing on the application of principles of proof 
to specific types of damage, it is important that the distinction 
between direct and indirect damage be understood.39 
If a non-favored buyer does suffer some loss as a result of a 
price discrimination the loss is most likely to occur indirectly 
through operation of the competitive process. Perhaps the most 
obvious type of such indirect or consequential damage is the loss 
of prospective profits which results from a loss of sales to favored 
competitors. In this instance the amount of profit which would 
have been made on the sales which were lost constitutes damage.40 
Indirect damage may also be sustained through a decrease in the 
plaintiff's profit margin on continuing operations, i.e., on those 
sales which the plaintiff was able to retain. This form of indirect 
loss can occur in three distinct ways. A non-favored buyer may 
find it necessary to incur an increase in his sales or operating 
expenses in attempting to avoid or offset the competitive advan-
so The terms "direct damage" and "indirect damage" have been adopted here to 
denote two broad categories of damage and this terminology is used throughout this 
comment. The courts have generally used the term "special damages" to refer to the 
types of loss here labeled "indirect damage." 
_.o E.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th 
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (first-line competition-profit lost on sales 
which would have been made but for price discrimination); Richfield Oil Corp. v. 
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 714-15 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960) 
(first-line competition-profit lost on sales which would have been made but,for illegal 
restraint); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
835 (1957) {second-line competition-loss of profits on sales which plaintiff would have 
made but for defendant's unlawful refusal to sell to plaintiff); Enterprise Indus. v. The 
Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 458-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (second-line 
competition-loss of profits necessary to show damage); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth 
.Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949) (second-line competition-loss resulting 
from diversion of customers). 
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tage conferred upon favored buyers by the discrimination.41 If, 
instead of increasing his sales or operating expenses, the non-
favored buyer decides to reduce his resale price to meet the com-
petition of favored buyers, his profit margin will similarly be 
reduced.42 Such involuntary price reductions are similar to in-
creased selling and operating expenses in that both represent 
a loss of profit incurred in mitigating the loss inflicted by the 
discriminatory advantage of favored buyers.43 Finally, if a non-
favored buyer loses sales he may find that in addition to a loss 
of anticipated profits on those sales, he has suffered an increase 
in the unit cost of producing, handling, or even selling the par-
ticular commodity involved due to a loss of economies of large 
scale operation.44 In each of these three instances the amount of 
the decrease in profit margin on continuing operations constitutes 
damage. 
A third type of indirect damage may be found in a general 
depreciation of the value of the plaintiff's business as a gomg 
41 Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert 
denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) (second-line competition-increased cost of operation of 
plaintiff's cosmetic department); cf. Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 
supra note 40. Such expenses can result, for example, from increased advertising, increased 
promotion or sales effort (as in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., supra), or 
additional sales features offered with the product involved. An increase in a non-favored 
buyer's cost of doing business can also occur in the form of a direct and unlawfully 
discriminatory increase in the price charged the buyer by the seller, in excess of the 
price which would have prevailed absent the discrimination. This type of increased 
costs will be considered under the heading "direct damage.'' 
42 American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 914 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946) (first-line competition-profit lost by reducing selling 
price to meet competition); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146 (D. Ore. 1958) 
(second-line competition-amount of reduction in resale price necessary to meet reduced 
prices of favored competitors); cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (1931), in which defendants conspired unlawfully to drive plaintiff 
out of business by selling in competition with plaintiff at prices below cost. Plaintiff, 
forced to lower its prices to meet the competition, recovered the difference between the 
lower sale price and what the sale price would have been absent defendants' conspiracy. 
43 In some instances a buyer may be required to mitigate his loss. See cases cited 
note 9 supra. A reasonable opportunity to mitigate should exist, of course. The require• 
ment could not be imposed prior to the time when the buyer knew that a loss was 
occurring, and one should not be required to mitigate his loss if it is not economically 
feasible to do so, or where it would involve unreasonable hardship. It would seem that 
a reasonable business judgment against spending money in mitigation should not limit 
a plaintiff's recovery for loss sustained. Where mitigation is required, however, recovery 
should be limited to the cost of mitigation so far as it would or did involve expense 
exceeding usual business expenses. 
44 Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block 8e Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (first-line competition-increased cost of production 
due to reduced sales). 
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concern, reflecting the reduced business-getting ability of the 
business and the effect which the impairment of its competitive 
position may be expected to have on its prospects for future oper-
ation and growth.45 
The various types of indirect damage possess a common char-
acteristic which distinguishes them from direct damage (discussed 
later)- they can occur only if the non-favored buyer loses sales 
or is forced to incur an increase in cost or a decrease in profit to 
avoid a loss of sales. Such a loss or threatened loss of sales is not 
inflicted by the discrimination itsel£46 but by favored buyers' use 
of the competitive advantage given them by the discrimination 
in the form of lower purchase or operating costs compared to 
those of non-favored buyers. 
Two significant consequences flow from the causal character-
istics of indirect damage. First, the fact that a discrimination 
occurred does not necessarily indicate that a non-favored buyer 
suffered any loss. Second, the amount of such indirect damage 
as may occur in any given case bears no necessary or predictable 
relationship either to the amount of the discrimination involved _ 
or to the complainant's purchase volume. 
Before a loss can occur the discriminatory benefit must be 
competitively used by a favored buyer in such a way that the non-
favored buyer feels the effect of its use in his business. If the 
amount of the discrimination is distributed by a favored buyer 
45 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1931) 
(first-line competition-depreciation in value of plaintiff's plant); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. 
v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra note 44, at 958-59 (first-line competition-extent to 
which value of plaintiff's assets or property had been diminished); Flintkote Co. v. 
Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957) (second-line 
competition-expenses incurred by plaintiff in establishing business which was caused to 
fail in its infancy); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 992 (S.D. Fla. 
1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) (second-line competition-injury to overall 
business structure and operation reflected in failure to maintain progress in line with the 
growth of the citrus industry in Florida). It should be noted that the depreciated value 
of a business will reflect a loss of good-will and hence that loss of good-will is not a 
separate item of damage. 
However, the various types of loss or damage discussed above as indirect damages 
are not mutually exclusive and several types of loss may exist simultaneously. Atlas 
Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., supra note 44, at 958-59; Flintkote 
Co. v. Lysfjord, supra at 389-90. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., supra at 992-93, 
recognized that care must be taken to avoid overlapping in various categories of loss, 
though the court manifested an inability to separate categories of loss with any significant 
degree of specificity. 
46 It must be remembered that the discussion in this comment is concerned only with 
the effect of price discrimination in second-line competition. 
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as additional profits it could hardly be the cause of competitive 
harm to any non-favored buyer. Even if it is retained in the fa-
vored buyer's business, it cannot cause a loss to any non-favored 
buyer unless it is used against him. Thus if a defendant seller 
could show that favored buyers used the amount of the discrimi-
nation in competitive effort directed at competitors other than 
the complaining non-favored buyer,47 or that the amount of the 
discrimination simply was not used competitively,48 the defendant 
seller would seem to have established that the discrimination could 
not have damaged the complainant. 
Furthermore, even if a favored buyer uses the amount of the 
discrimination competitively against a non-favored buyer, that 
use will not inevitably hurt the latter buyer. Before he can suffer 
any loss the competitive use made of the discriminatory benefit 
by the favored buyer must be effective actually to influence the 
choice which third-line customers make in deciding whether or 
not to buy from the non-favored buyer, for unless the non-favored 
buyer loses sales as a result of the discrimination ( or is forced to 
incur expense or loss of profit to avoid a loss of sales), he cannot 
be injured by it in any way thus far discussed. The use to which 
the discrimination is put must be sufficient in the particular 
market situation to overcome other factors which influence the 
third-line customer's decision. Those factors may include busi-
ness reputation, location, facilities, quality and extent of services 
offered, sales personalities, nature of sales approach and promo-
tional activity, variety and extent of stock on hand, and credit 
policy, as well as pricing. Where the complaining buyer is a 
manufacturer or processor relevant factors may also include brand 
reputation, product features, and product quality.40 The type of 
competitive use made of the discrimination may also be important, 
for the effect of general advertising, price reductions, or concen-
47 It is perhaps possible that the complainant could be hurt if the use of the dis• 
crimination against some competitors caused a general intensification of competition in 
the market as a whole. This particular circumstance seems unlikely and would be 
extremely difficult to prove. 
48 It would seem that a plaintiff's failure to show any intensified sales effort (adver-
tising, price reduction, etc.) by favored competitors would be persuasive evidence that the 
discriminatory benefit was not used competitively. Some showing as to the probable use 
made of the benefit is necessary to a plaintiff's case, for absent such showing it would seem 
impossible for him to establish that alleged damage was caused by the defendant's 
discrimination. 
49 In some instances competing buyers may sell different products. In such a case the 
interchangeability of the ultimate competing products themselves becomes an important 
factor. See American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 56 (8th Cir. 1951). 
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trated sales effort directed at particular customers may not be 
the same even in a given market situation. 
In determining the effect that a price discrimination may 
have had on a non-favored buyer's business, therefore, it may be 
necessary to consider a number of variable market factors. It 
may also be necessary to consider certain characteristics of the 
discrimination itself. The amount of the discrimination and the 
length of time during which it was given may be significant, for 
unless the amount involved was substantial as compared at least 
with the non-favored buyer's resale profit margin on the item (or 
on the unit in which the item was incorporated) the discrimina-
tion may have had no real competitive value. The nature of the 
item affected by the discrimination may be significant, for the 
fact that a competitor received a price break on a minor com-
ponent of a large assembled unit, or on an item which was of 
little consequence in the total business involved, may not have 
given the competitor any real competitive advantage.50 Where 
the item represented a significant part of the buyer's cost of doing 
business the situation may be entirely different.51 Furthermore, 
the geographic markets in which favored and non-favored buyers 
sell are not necessarily coextensive in every case. The extent to 
which a complaining non-favored buyer did business in compe-
tition with favored buyers during the period of discrimination 
may thus be an important factor in determining the extent to 
which a price discrimination may have caused loss to the non-
favored buyer. 
It should be apparent that the amount of any type of indirect 
damage is not determined by the amount of the discrimination 
and is not influenced by the complainant's purchase volume. 
Rather, the amount of such damage is determined by the interplay 
of competitive market factors which are influenced by the presence 
of discrimination, and is dependent upon the complainant's loss 
or prospective loss of sales volume. 52 
50 In Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791-92 (7th Cir. 
1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952), 
the court found no reasonable possibility that discrimination in the pricing of heating 
controls could "substantially injure" competition in heating units into which the controls 
were built (and hence no violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act). 
51 See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 766, 768 (7th Cir. 
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1931); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 
985, 989-90 (S.D. Fla. 1949), afj'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951). 
52 The number of sales lost bears no necessary relationship to the amount of plaintiff's 
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B. Proof of Indirect Damage 
I. Loss of Profit on Anticipated Sales Lost 
to Favored Competitors 
[Vol. 60 
In proving the fact of loss plaintiff must establish the exist-
ence of a business loss in the form of a loss of sales. This can be 
established from plaintiff's business records by showing a decline 
of sales volume (or of the rate of growth of sales volume) in the 
item involved in the discrimination during the period in ques-
tion. 53 In some cases it may be necessary to compare plaintiff's 
sales figures with those of his competitors. Of course the fact 
that the non-favored buyer lost sales to a favored buyer, or was 
threatened with such a loss, does not make the seller liable for the 
non-favored buyer's attendant damage unless the discrimination 
was the proximate cause of the damage. Thus, if a plaintiff claims 
damage from a loss of sales, he must show not only that sales were 
lost to a favored competitor but that it was the competitive advan-
tage given the competitor by the seller's price discrimination that. 
enabled the competitor to take those sales from the plaintiff.114 
The fact that the loss of sales of the item in question was 
caused by defendant's price (or price-related) discrimination can 
be established by showing that favored competitors did not suffer 
a similar decline in sales or sales growth (i.e., that the loss was 
peculiar to the plaintiff's business), and that the discrimination 
was substantial in amount and competitively used by one or more 
of plaintiff's favored competitors. In the case of a discriminatorily 
excessive charge (discussed later under "direct damage") plaintiff 
would show that he was forced to raise his resale prices substan-
tially above the competitive resale price level. Customer testimony 
and other evidence concerning the effect which the favored buyer's 
competitive use of the discrimination had on the customers' buy-
ing decisions may be important, as may evidence of plaintiff's 
purchases, particularly if the plaintiff did only part of his business in competition with 
favored competitors. Further, even the total number of units sold by plaintiff during the 
period when he was feeling the effect of the discrimination is not necessarily the same 
as the number of units he purchased during the period. If the plaintiff was drawing 
from inventory on hand at the beginning of the period, he may have purchased less 
than he sold; if he carried over inventory at the end of the period he may have purchased 
more than he sold. 
113 See generally cases cited note 40 supra. 
114 See generally cases cited notes 27, 40 supra. 
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good business management. Plaintiff's evidence must, however, 
outweigh the defendant's evidence tending to show that the dis-
crimination and its use by favored buyers was not substantial 
enough to influence customers' buying decisions, and that plain-
tiff's loss was caused by factors such as bad management, business 
recession (affecting the item in question), sales technique, and 
others.1111 
Once the fact that a loss of sales was caused by defendant's 
discrimination is established, plaintiff must provide a reasonably 
accurate means of estimating the amount of loss. If the loss of 
specific sales can be shown56 plaintiff's business records should 
provide a basis for calculating the amount of profit that would 
have been made on each sale, and that profit per sale can be 
multiplied by the number of sales lost.57 If specific sales lost can-
not be determined, various methods of approximation are avail-
able. These include comparison of the plaintiff's sales volume 
before the impact of defendant's violation with sales volume dur-
ing the violation, comparison of plaintiff's sales volume during 
the period of defendant's violation with the sales volume of a 
comparable business not affected by defendant's violation, and 
expert testimony as to hypothetical sales volume.58 In each in-
stance evidence as to probable costs will be necessary because loss 
is measured by anticipated profit, not by anticipated gross receipts. 
2. Loss of Profit Margin on Continuing Operations 
a. Increased Sales and Operating Expenses. The very exist-
ence of the expenses demonstrates that loss occurred. The fact 
that the loss was proximately caused by defendant's violation can 
be established by showing that the expenses were reasonably nec-
essary to meet or offset competitive activity of one or more favored 
buyers, and that the competitive activity of those favored buyers 
represented a use of the benefit conferred upon them by the 
defendant-seller's discrimination. The entire amount of such ex-
115 See generally cases cited notes 27, 40-42 supra. 
116 This may be possible where sales are of a large item, such as business machines. 
See McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456 (W .D. Mo. 1948), 
where, however, plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's violations were the cause of 
of plaintiff's loss of sales. 
117 See cases cited note 40 supra. 
118 An excellent and recent discussion of these methods of approximation is found in 
Timberlake, supra note 3, at 261-77. 
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penses (insofar as not "passed on")59 represents damage to the 
plaintiff,60 and can easily be proved from the plaintiff's business 
records. 
b. Involuntary Resale Price Reductions. Here plaintiff must 
show that he lowered his resale price ( or did not raise it when 
he normally would have), and that the price reduction was rea-
sonably necessary to combat the effect of competitive activity 
(price cutting or other activity) by favored competitors made 
possible by defendant's discrimination. Such a loss represents 
another cost of mitigation and is measured by the amount of the 
reduction (or the amount by which the resale price would other-
wise have been raised) multiplied by the number of sales made 
at the reduced price.61 These figures should be readily ascertain-
able from plaintiff's business records. 
c. Loss of Economies of Scale. The fact of loss is established 
by figures showing reduced production or reduced total sales of 
the item involved and by cost figures showing an increase in the 
unit cost of production or handling. Causation is established by 
showing that the reduced production or sales represents a loss 
of sales already shown to have been caused by favored competi-
tors' use of the benefit conferred by the defendant seller's dis-
crimination. The amount of damages is calculated by multiplying 
the amount of increased unit cost by the number of units pro-
duced or sold during the period in question.62 
3. Depreciated Value of the Business 
The difficulties of proving this type of loss would bear ex-
tensive discussion, but in the context of this comment it will 
suffice to observe generally that evidence showing a depreciation 
in value of the plaintiff's business, and that the depreciation was 
the result of a loss of sales caused by defendant's discrimination, 
59 See discussion regarding "passing on" in text accompanying notes 73-76 infra. 
60 See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
835 (1957); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir), 
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). 
61 American Co-op. Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 914 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946); Youngson v. Tidewater Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 146, 147 
(D. Ore. 1958); cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 
(1931). 
62 See generally Atlas Bldg. Prods. v. Diamond Block &: Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 958 
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). Conceivably the "passing on" defense 
could come into play here. 
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will establish the existence of compensable loss. The amount of 
damages is measured by the amount of the depreciation so shovm. 63 
C. Direct or Immediate Damage 
The only way in which a seller's price discrimination can 
directly injure a non-favored buyer is by causing that buyer to 
pay a higher price for the commodities in question than he would 
pay absent the seller's discrimination. Here the damage is not 
inflicted by a favored buyer's use of the discrimination but by 
the discrimination itself. 
Direct damage of this sort can be found where a seller, in 
violation of the antitrust laws, causes a buyer to pay a price in 
excess of a reasonable price-a reasonable price being the price 
which would prevail if the market were free of the seller's un-
lawful conduct. In such a case the buyer is damaged in the amount 
by which the price he was forced to pay exceeded the price which 
he would have paid if the market had been free of the seller's un-
lawful conduct,64 at least to the extent that the buyer does not 
otherwise recoup this loss.65 
As a general principle of antitrust damage law this concept 
of direct damage through unlawfully excessive prices66 is hardly 
63 See cases cited note 45 supra; Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and 
Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. 
L. REv. 2!11, 277-8!1 (1961). 
'64 Thomsen v. Cayser, 24!1 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) ("If ... more than a reasonable rate 
was secured by the [unlawful] combination, the excess over what was reasonable was an 
element of injury."); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1960) (city 
injured where caused by unlawful conspiracy to pay a price for pipe in excess of a 
reasonable price); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1938) ("enhancement" of 
price resulting from defendant's illegal monopoly held actionable damage); Straus v. 
Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791, 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1924) (plaintiff recovered 
difference between tbe defendant-seller's established price, which was found reasonable, 
and the inflated price, which an illegal combination caused plaintiff to pay); American 
Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1915) (where plaintiff alleges 
damage because unlawful combination compelled him to buy at a price higher than 
market value, he must show evidence as to market value in the years in question); 
Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 
888, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (one paying a price to a monopolist may recover "the amount 
of any overcharge,'' but must offer evidence from which the overcharge can be approxi-
mated). See also cases cited notes 68-69 infra. 
65 See, e.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941) (plaintiff failed to show any loss in profit margin and hence was 
denied recovery-the inflated purchase price was "passed on" to plaintiff's customers). 
66 It is important to distinguish between direct damage in the form of an unlaw-
fully imposed increase in buying cost (i.e., an excessive charge), and indirect damage 
in the form of an increase in the general cost of doing business resulting from ex-
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subject to question. The principle was originally established in 
actions under section 7 of the Sherman Act and carried over into 
actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act (which superseded the 
old section 7). Although it has received suprisingly little discus-
sion in recent years the continuing validity of the principle has 
not been challenged67 and examples of its recent application in 
situations paralleling price discrimination can be found. In Flint-
kote Co. v. Lysfjord68 the defendant, pursuant to a conspiracy to 
monopolize trade, refused to sell tile to the plaintiff buyer and 
the buyer was consequently forced to turn to a more expensive 
source of supply. The buyer was permitted to recover as one 
element of its damage the amount by which the cost of obtaining 
tile was thus increased. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp.,69 the plaintiff buyer was held to have a cause of 
action for damages where the defendant seller, through its un-
lawful control of the market, charged plaintiff an excessive price 
for the lease of shoe machinery. The amount of damage was held 
to be "the difference between what plaintiff was charged and what 
it could properly have been charged in the absence of the monop-
olistic practices." 
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether there has been judicial 
recognition of the applicability of this principle of damage to 
price (or price-related) discrimination cases.70 But there can be 
penditures which a non-favored buyer found it necessary to make in order to offset 
the competitive advantage of a favored buyer so as to avoid a loss of sales (and of 
the prospective profits which those sales represent) to the favored buyer. While both 
types of damage are "increased costs" and operate to decrease the non-favored buyer's 
profit margin, they nonetheless occur differently and are caused differently, and it is 
possible for them to exist simultaneously. In the case of direct damage it is the seller's 
wrongful acts that alter the non-favored buyer's profit margin. 'Where indirect damage 
(in the form of increased costs) is involved, the non-favored buyer alters his own profit 
margin to combat the competitive market effect of the seller's wrongful acts. It may 
be observed that the so-called "passing on" defense should theoretically apply to any 
type of damage in the form of increased costs. 
67 See, e.g., Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in 
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MrcH. L. REv. 363, 404 (1954); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 
469 (1961). The authors accept the principle without question. The cases which con-
sider the "passing on" defense implicitly assume the validity of this fundamental 
principle of damages. See cases cited note 75 infra. 
68 246 F.2d 368, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). 
69 185 F. Supp. 826, 829 (M.D. Pa.), afj'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 901 (1960). 
70 See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947); 
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 773 (1945); Becker-Lehmann v. Firestone Tire 8c Rubber Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 
75406, 75409 (E.D. Mo. 1959); Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 
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little doubt that the principle is as applicable to an excessive price 
which is unlawful because discriminatory as it is to an excessive 
price which is unlawful because made possible by a monopoly 
or by a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain trade. In either 
case the buyer is forced to incur an increase in his cost of doing 
business which, but for the unlawful conduct of the seller, he 
would not have had to incur, and that increase in cost represents 
damage to the buyer insofar as the buyer's business thereby real-
izes a lower profit than it would have absent the discrimination. 
It is important to observe, however, that the mere fact that 
one buyer paid more for his goods than another does not mean 
that the first buyer necessarily paid more than he would have 
if the seller had not discriminated against him. If the seller 
gave a special discount on only a small portion of his business, 
it is unlikely that in any event he would have given a similar 
discount on all sales. Absent the discrimination the complaining 
buyer (along with all other buyers) would probably have paid 
the same price he paid during the period of discrimination, or 
at best a price somewhere between the price he did pay and the 
lowest price paid by a favored buyer. 
Consequently, an "excessive price" situation must be carefully 
distinguished from a "discounted price'' situation. A buyer pays 
an "excessive price" to the extent that he pays more than he 
would have paid in a market free of the seller's unlawful conduct. 
A buyer pays a "discounted price" to the extent that he pays less 
than he would have in a market free of the seller's unlawful 
conduct. The fact that a favored buyer receives a discount will 
not damage a non-favored buyer unless the favored buyer uses 
his competitive advantage (lower costs) effectively to threaten the 
non-favored buyer with a loss of sales. The fact that a non-favored 
buyer pays an excessive price, on the other hand, damages him 
immediately and directly by increasing his cost of purchasing the 
commodities he uses or resells over what that cost would other-
wise be, and can also damage him indirectly to the extent that 
his competitive disadvantage (higher buying costs than his com-
990 (S.D. Fla. 1949), afj'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951). But see Siegfried v. Kansas City 
Star Co., 193 F. Supp. 427, 432 (W.D. Mo. 1961), afj'd, 298 F.2d I (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
369 U.S. 819 (1962); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Civil 
No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961 (the unequal expense burden in handling de-
fendant's products, which claimant would not have had to bear if there had been 
no discrimination, held a direct business damage). 
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petitor) causes him to lose sales to his competitor or to incur other 
expenses to avoid such a loss of sales. 
Even though an unlawfully excessive price involves a form 
of "damage" which is directly imposed on the buyer by the seller, 
the buyer may not necessarily recover the amount by which the 
price charged was excessive merely by showing that he was charged 
more than he would have been charged absent the discrimina-
tion.71 The defendant seller may defeat the buyer's claim by 
showing that the buyer would have made no more profit even if 
he had not had to pay the excessive prices which the seller un-
lawfully charged, and hence that the buyer was not actually dam-
aged by the excessive prices.72 The requirement that a plaintiff 
in a treble damage action can recover only for damage actually 
sustained gives rise therefore to the sometimes misunderstood 
"passing on" defense in treble damage actions based on price 
discrimination or the charging of unlawfully high prices.73 
The "passing on" defense arises from a recognition of the 
fact that in some peculiar market situations where the buyer's 
resale profit is not strongly dependent •upon his buying cost (as 
distinguished from general operating cost) it is possible for a 
buyer to pay "excessive prices" for a commodity he resells without 
being any worse off financially than he would be if he had paid 
a lower price, and that if the buyer is no worse off he has not 
actually been damaged "in his business or property."74 The classic 
71 This is in sharp contrast to the right given in an action under the Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1958), to recover the 
amount of an overcharge or excessive charge (the amount by which the price charged 
exceeded the published rates) as such, without reference to whether the plaintiff was 
damaged by the overcharge. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 
582-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); 
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747, 750-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 
U.S. 644 (1941). See ICC v. United States, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933); Southern Pac. 
Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918) (the fact that plaintiffs were 
able to pass on the amount of the unreasonable charge will not prevent their recov• 
ering the overpayment from the carriers); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 
428-29 (1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 202-03 
(1913). 
72 See cases cited notes 74, 75 infra. 
73 For discussion of the "passing on" defense, see generally: Clark, supra note 67, 
at 404-06; Timberlake, supra note 63, at 249-51; Comment, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 135-37 
(1950); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 469 (1961); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1023-26 (1952). 
There seems no reason in theory why this defense should not apply to increased costs 
sustained in avoiding a loss of sales equally as well as to increased buying costs. 
74 This is generally approached as a question of whether or not the plaintiff 
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example of this situation, typically involving non-discriminatory 
pricing, is found in the Oil Jobbers cases75 in which the resale 
prices of gasoline were determined by a formula which included a 
fixed profit margin for distributors and where distributors of com-
peting brands followed the price leadership of one primary brand. 
There the fact that the defendants raised the price of gasoline to dis-
tributors did not cause the distributors to lose any sales (for com-
peting distributors resold at the same higher resale prices),76 nor 
recouped ("passed on'') the amount by which the prices were excessive. Dictum in 
two cases suggests it may also be approached as a question of whether plaintiff would 
have been any better off at a lower purchase price. "Exaction of this higher . . • 
rate may not have injured Keogh at all; for a lower rate might not have benefited him. 
Every competitor was entitled to be put-and we must presume would have been put-
on a parity with him. • . . Under these circumstances no court or jury could say 
that, if the rate had been lower, Keogh would have enjoyed the difference between 
the rates or that any other advantage would have accrued to him. The benefit might 
have gone to his customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer." Keogh v. Chi-
cago & No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922). 
"[T]he only claim . • . as to damages actually suffered is . . • that if plaintiff 
could have bought its gasoline at the lower price allegedly paid by other purchasers, 
it would have increased its profits by the amount of this price differential. This is, 
of course, entirely speculative. It assumes that plaintiff could have continued to sell 
gasoline at the same price while paying less for it, an unlikely eventuality in view of 
the fact that it was in competition with other retail dealers buying from defendant who 
would also have to receive the benefit of a lower price from defendant and could 
therefore lower their retail price." Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 
665, 667-68 (D. Mass. 1959). 
At times the "passing on" defense has apparently been viewed as involving a very 
mechanical test. "[T]o prove his damages the plaintiff must show (1) that the de-
fendant illegally increased the price of plaintiff's supplies, and (2) plaintiff's selling 
price did not then rise enough to compensate for the rise in costs." Clark, supra note 
67, at 406. See Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), 
rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); cf. Miller Motors v. Ford Motor 
Co., 252 F,2d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 
(9th Cir. 1955). 
Such a mechanical test, however, will not work in the situation where a buyer's 
resale price is responsive to the influence of a variety of factors in addition to buying 
cost and consequently does not vary in a fixed relationship to buying cost. The court 
in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829-31 (M.D. Pa.), 
aff'd, 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), apparently recognized this 
fact in holding the defense of "passing on" was not available where the injured cus-
tomer was a consumer (manufacturer) rather than a middleman. The discussion in 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 791-92 (7th Cir. 1951), 
cert. granted, 342 U.S. 940 (1952), cert. dismissed as untimely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952) is 
relevant to this point, though no damage issue was before the court in that case. 
75 Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 
U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941). 
76 It has been suggested that loss might have occurred through an industry-wide 
decrease in volume of sales. See Comment, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 130, 136 (1950); cf. Clark, 
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to lose any profit on sales made (for if the price to them had not 
been raised, their resale prices would have been set lower to give 
them the same margin of profit). 
The Oil Jobbers cases, of course, presented a very unusual 
market situation. Normally, resale profit is primarily dependent 
upon the cost of buying the particular commodity involved, and 
it is not so likely that a buyer will be able to escape damage if he 
raises his resale price after paying an unlawfully excessive purchase 
price; this is especially true if the excessive price is discriminatory 
rather than uniform to all buyers as it was in the Oil,Jobbers cases. 
For one thing, the buyer might well have raised his resale price 
even though his purchase cost had not been raised, assuming the 
possibility of raising the resale price without a significant loss of 
sales. In this circumstance the excessive purchase price which he 
was caused to pay reduced the profit the buyer would otherwise 
have made from his advanced resale prices. The amount by which 
the purchase price was excessive would thus remain direct dam-
age which was not, and probably could not have been, "passed on." 
On the other hand, if the buyer was forced to raise his resale price 
in a market where he would not otherwise have raised it, he has 
recouped his direct loss by "passing it on," but he then is likely 
to suffer consequential or indirect damages resulting from a loss 
of sales.77 
The "passing on" defense illustrates the basic fact that a pri-
vate treble damage claimant may not recover damages under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act unless he shows that he would have 
been financially better off if he had been free of the defendant's 
unlawful conduct, i.e., that he would have made profits which the 
defendant's conduct prevented him from making.78 
supra note 67, at 406. This would seem doubtful and highly speculative, however, in 
view of the nature of the commodity and the market there involved. 
77 In the Oil Jobbers cases the "passing on" precluded both direct and indirect 
damage, because the distributors were no worse off either as to profit margin or as to 
sales volume. Where a discriminatory price is "passed on" however, the buyer is 
likely to suffer "indirect damage" from reduced sales volume even though he may be 
no worse off as to profit margin and hence sustains no "direct damage." 
78 It is interesting to observe that while an overcharge can be recovered under the 
Interstate Commerce Act without further inquiry as to damage sustained, the amount 
of a discriminatory rebate or discount given a shipper other than the plaintiff cannot 
be recovered as such. Recovery in the latter instance is permitted only for such damage 
as the plaintiff can prove he sustained as a result of the discrimination. ICC v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1933); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 428-29 
(1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1913). 
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D. Proof of Direct Damage 
A direct loss in the form of an excessive charge exacted by the 
seller can be established simply by showing that the plaintiff paid 
more for certain commodities than he would have absent the dis-
crimination,70 and that the plaintiff's profit margin was thereby 
reduced (i.e., that the excessive charge was not "passed on").80 
Such a showing establishes the existence of the loss, and the fact 
that the defendant-seller charged the discriminatorily excessive 
price conclusively establishes causation. The amount of the dam-
age is the difference between what plaintiff did pay, and what he 
would have paid absent the defendant's discrimination, multiplied 
by the amount of plaintiff's purchases during the period of dis-
70 See cases cited notes 64, 68, 69 supra. If a price-discrimination occurs in items 
which are not bought for resale but rather which represent a capital investment (as in 
bu}ing machinery for a plant, or equipment for a store or a bowling alley), or which 
are used in manufacturing another product, the basic inquiry remains the same: Would 
the non-favored buyer (plaintiff) have paid less absent the discrimination? If so, he 
has sustained direct damage in the amount by which the price he paid exceeded the 
price he would have paid absent the seller's discrimination. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 826, 829-31 (M.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 281 F.2d 481 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 901 (1960), which held that the "passing on" defense 
is not available to a defendant seller where the injured buyer is a "consumer" (manu-
facturer) rather than a middleman; hence, where the item involved represents capital 
investment or is consumed in manufacturing another product, plaintiff need not prove 
that the excessive charge actually reduced his profit margin. 
Whether or not the non-favored buyer of such an item paid more than he would 
have absent the seller's discrimination, he can recover the amount of such indirect 
damage as he may have sustained as a result of the competitive advantage given favored 
competitors by the discrimination. 
so ,vhere it can reasonably be inferred from the facts that the excessive charge 
was not or could not have been "passed on,'' the existence of an unlawful excessive 
charge will be prima facie evidence that the plaintiff buyer's profit margin was reduced. 
See cases cited notes 64, 68 supra. ,vhere the facts suggest that the excessive charge 
may have been "passed on" by the plaintiff, rather than "absorbed,'' the plaintiff may 
be required to show that his retail price was not increased in an amount representing 
all or part of the excessive charge. See Miller Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441, 
448 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1955); Clark 
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 
734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 
747, 750 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 
162 F. Supp. 32, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959). 
But see Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra note 79, at 829-31, which 
held that such a showing was not necessary where the plaintiff was a consumer (manu-
facturer) of goods bought from defendant, rather than a middleman. The inquiry, of 
course, is whether the plaintiff's profit margin was lower as a result of the defendant's 
violation, not simply whether or not the plaintiff raised his resale price. The mere 
fact that the plaintiff raised his resale price should not be considered as a mechanical 
test for "passing on" in market situations where the buyer's resale price is responsive 
to the influence of factors other than buying cost alone, and consequently does not 
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crimination81 (provided none of that difference was "passed on" 
to consumers). It should be observed that in this instance the 
amount of damage is related to the amount of plaintiff's purchases 
and is totally unrelated to his volume of sales during the period. 
This is the only instance in which damage is dependent upon 
purchase volume rather than on sales volume. Even here, however, 
the amount of damage bears no necessary relationship to the 
amount of the discrimination, for while the non-favored buyer 
might have paid less in the absence of the seller's discrimination, 
all buyers in that event might have paid more than the favored 
buyers actually did during the period of discrimination, and such 
loss as the non-favored buyer did sustain may have been "passed 
on" in whole or in part. 
It will not be possible to determine whether a price charged 
a non-favored buyer was excessive, and in what amount, until it 
has been determined what that buyer would have been charged if 
the seller had not discriminated in price. The determination of 
what the "reasonable market price" would have been absent the 
seller's discrimination may include consideration of such factors 
as: (1) the price charged by other sellers of similar goods; (2) the 
portion of the defendant-seller's business done at low prices com-
pared with the portion done at high prices; (3) the defendant-
seller's profit margin; (4) the defendant-seller's own competitive 
position (including the desirability of the defendant-seller's prod-
uct and the practical availability of interchangeable competing 
products; (5) the extent to which favored and non-favored buyers 
did business in competition with each other; and (6) when avail-
able, the prices prevailing after the end of the period of violation. 
vary in a fixed or constant relationship to buying cost. See note 74 supra and text 
accompanying note 77 supra. It has been suggested in dictum that where all buyers 
have paid an excessive (but non-discriminatory) price none of them necessarily have 
been damaged because all would have received the benefit of a lower price (assuming 
lawful pricing) and competition might then have forced the resale price down ac-
cordingly. Keogh v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922); Secatore's, Inc. v. 
Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665, 667-68 (D. Mass. 1959). This rationale can 
apply where the plaintiff paid a discriminatorily excessive price only if other com• 
peting buyers were also discriminated against by the defendant seller. 
81 See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 
U.S. 390 (1906); Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938); Strauss v. Victor Talking 
Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (2d Cir. 1924); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 
Fed. 77 (2d Cir. 1915); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors &: 
Publishers, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See also Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957). 
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Naturally, courts and defendants' attorneys would prefer to avoid 
the necessity of making such a determination, but the necessity for 
such determinations is not new in antitrust proceedings82 and would 
appear inevitable within the present framework of antitrust dam-
age law. Some of the apparent impossibilities of such a determina-
tion disappear when it is remembered that only the existence of 
compensable loss need be proved with certainty. If plaintiff's evi-
dence shows he would have paid some price less than he did, and 
the defendant's evidence does not rebut that showing, the fact of 
loss has been established. The amount of loss then need only be 
estimated, though of course the evidence must provide a basis for 
estimating the amount of loss with reasonable accuracy. 
E. Damage Resulting From Price-Related Discrimination 
It should be noted that price-related discriminations can oper-
ate in the same way as ordinary price discriminations. For example, 
if a seller provides a favored buyer with a clerk or demonstrator, 
or with advertising, or if the seller gives the favored buyer an 
allowance to be used to finance a demonstrator or advertising, and 
if that favored buyer did not already have the demonstrator or 
was not already doing the particular advertising involved, the use 
of the demonstrator or the advertising represents increased pro-
motional activity by the favored buyer. This extra promotional 
activity may cause non-favored competing buyers to lose sales and 
hence to suffer damage in the form of lost profits,83 and may 
also force the non-favored buyer to hire a similar demonstrator 
or to increase his advertising in order to avoid a continuing loss 
of sales. If he would not have incurred that increased expense 
but for the influence of the seller's discrimination, the non-
favored buyer has suffered damage in the form of involuntarily 
increased operating expenses.84 
82 See Thomsen v. Cayser, supra note 81; Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure 
Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Peto v. Howell, supra 
note 81; American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, supra note 81, at 80; Alden-
Rochelle, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, supra note 81. 
83 See Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1949). 
84 It would appear that this was the situation in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth 
Arden Sales Corp., supra note 83, at 153, reversing 82 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant furnished services of "special personnel," 
82 F. Supp. at 687, and "supplied .•• assistants" to plaintiff's competitors, 178 F.2d 
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A price-related discrimination can also cause direct damage in 
the form of excessive costs. For example, if a seller gives favored 
buyers an allowance to be used to pay the salary of clerks already 
employed by the favored buyers and which the favored buyers 
would have employed even without the benefit of the discrimina-
tion, or an allowance to pay for advertising which the favored 
buyers would have done even without the benefit of the discrimina-
tion, then the seller's discrimination has lowered the operating 
costs of the favored buyers. If a non-favored buyer can show that 
he too would have received an allowance but for the discrimina-
tion, the amount of such allowance which he would have received 
represents damage in the form of "increased" costs, directly im-
posed by the seller's discrimination.85 Proof of damage resulting 
at 151. This would seem to indicate that these "assistants" were not simply existing 
employees of the competitors, but were not additions to their staffs. 
85 Apparently that was the situation in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass 
Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). There plaintiff took on 
the Elizabeth Arden cosmetics line under an oral agreement in which the defendant 
agreed "to designate one of the clerks in appellee's [plaintiff's] toilet-goods depart-
ment as an Elizabeth Arden 'demonstrator,' " and to pay or reimburse plaintiff for 
one-half of the clerk's salary. Id. at 990. This would seem to indicate that the clerks 
involved were already employed by the plaintiff and by his more favored competitors 
(who received an allowance for a whole clerk's salary). The trial court found that 
absent the defendant's discrimination the plaintiff's costs would have been reduced by 
one-half of a clerk's salary, and hence that plaintiff was damaged in that amount. 
Id. at 995. The appellate court found direct loss in the "increased cost" of operation 
for plaintiff's cosmetics department, but noted that all discriminations do not neces-
sarily cause direct damage. Id. at 996. 
The author Gudge Johnsen) of the Elizabeth Arden opinion, dissenting in American 
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951), said at 61, that in 
Elizabeth Arden "[W]e held .•. that discrimination in favor of one dealer in a seller's 
products as against an immediate competitor, in granting allowances for services or 
facilities furnished by the dealer in marketing the seller's products, or in providing 
contributions of services or facilities to the dealer for such marketing, which were viola-
tive .•. of the Act, were recoverable as direct or immediate damages, to the extent of 
the illegal difference, where that difference represented money which the dealer would 
have saved in expenses or for which he would have been reimbursed ... , if the seller had 
accorded him equal treatment with his competitor. . • • [D]amages in such cases nor-
mally will consist of the amount which would have been saved in price or expense 
or restored through reimbursement, if there had been equal treatment. • • • Damages 
in the cash amount or cash value of such illegal discriminations seems to me therefore 
virtually automatically to follow under the Act as between immediate competitors • • • ." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The only error in this reasoning would appear to be the implicit assumption that 
absent discrimination, all dealers would have received (or should have received) an 
allowance representing a clerk's whole salary. The Elizabeth Arden opinion does not 
intimate whether there was any evidentiary basis for finding that the plaintiff would 
have received an allowance for a whole salary. In the American Can case, the error 
in reasoning is apparent, for there, absent the violation, the plaintiff would have paid 
more, rather than less, than he did during the period of violation. On this ground 
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from price-related discrimination is therefore no different from 
proof of damage from ordinary price discrimination. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF IMPLIED OR "AUTOMATIC" DAMAGES 
AND GENERAL DAMAGES 
A treble damage award is clearly valid where the existence of 
specific types of loss has been demonstrated and the amount of each 
type or category of loss has been estimated in a reasonably reliable 
fashion. Such an award is probably best described as a "special 
damages" award, using the term "special damages" as it is appa-
rently used in the cases to denote items of damage specifically 
proved. The question remains, however, as to what extent the fact 
and amount of the discrimination in a given case may in and of 
itself establish either the fact of loss or the amount of damages. 
A. "Automatic" Damages 
It can be argued that, except in rare situations, the plaintiff can 
show damage simply by proving the fact of an unlawful discrimina-
tion. 86 Two basic ideas are advanced in support of this proposition: 
(1) a buyer who is discriminated against by a seller is placed in a 
less advantageous competitive position as a result of the discrimi-
nation and must inevitably be injured as a result; 87 (2) a seller who 
the majority held plaintiff had not been damaged. Judge Johnsen's "error in reasoning" 
in his dissent in American Can was not, however, inadvertent, for in the Elizabeth 
Arden opinion he had intimated that once a seller had discriminated among competing 
buyers, the seller would be compelled to accord the "equality" of treatment required 
under the statute, by an award of damages to non-favored buyers in the amount of 
the discrimination. It would appear that Judge Johnsen's view was rejected by the 
majority in the American Can case (the same three judges decided both Elizabeth Arden 
and American Can). But see State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., Civil No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961, remanded by 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 
1958). There, defendants had violated § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act by buying 
advertising in a magazine published for A&P and used by A&P as a promotional device, 
without making comparable advertising or promotional allowances available to other 
retailers competing with A&P. The trial judge, in following the Elizabeth Arden deci-
sion, apparently accepted Judge Johnsen's view, for he indicated that retailers who 
advertised during the period of violation had been damaged "at least to the extent 
of the payments they ought to have received from the defendants, for unlike A&P, 
they have borne the cost of their advertising without the benefit of the defendants' aid." 
(Emphasis added.) 
86 See Clark, supra note 67, at 394. 
87 See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); American 
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55 (8th Cir. 1951); Clark, supra note 
67, at 408. 
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gave a benefit to one buyer in violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act should be compelled to give the same benefit to others; for if 
non-favored buyers had been treated as well as favored buyers 
were, non-favored buyers would have had more money in their 
treasuries to use as they chose and hence they have been damaged.88 
A "convenient" measure of such "inevitable loss" is the amount 
of the concession given favored buyers or the amount by which 
non-favored buyers are charged more than their competitors. 
Thus, when the plaintiff cannot or does not prove any specific 
losses, the award of "automatic damages" in the amount of the 
discrimination may be thought to be justified. 
This view, while it may appear reasonable in some situations, 
has much to condemn it.89 Its primary weakness lies in its tendency 
to confuse cause and effect. Ostensibly identifying an immediate 
and direct economic injury in the fact of the discrimination itself, 
this view does not require the plaintiff to show either actual detri-
mental competitive effect or that absent the discrimination he 
would have enjoyed a greater profit margin.90 But damage is by 
definition an effect-for our purposes the effect which unequal 
treatment has on a non-favored buyer. Unequal treatment is not 
itself an effect, but a cause.91 In actuality, therefore, the view sup-
ss See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea 
Co., Civil No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961 (the unequal expense burden in handling 
defendant's products, which claimant would not have had to bear, held a direct business 
damage); Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman 
Experience, 30 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 181, 220 (1961). 
Insofar as lack of equality may reflect a burden of expense that the complainant 
would not have had to bear but for the discrimination (supported by a finding that 
absent the discrimination complainant would have gotten the same favors that favored 
competitors received during the discrimination, and that complainant's resale price and 
volume would not have lowered), the "inequality" idea is an inarticulate reference to 
damage in the form of unrecouped increased expenses. 
89 See generally Clark, supra note 67, at 408-09. 
90 It should be noted that this view of direct damage has not been unequivocally 
adopted by any court and would perhaps be rejected by all courts. Some commentators, 
however, have interpreted judicial language to suggest this result. E.g., Comment, 18 
U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 130, 137 (1950); Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1023-24 (1952). Perhaps the 
confusion has been strengthened by judicial statements in cases where the issue was 
not actual damage to an individual business but rather the reasonable possibility of 
general injury to competition, such as: "[T]he Commission found what would appear 
to be obvious, that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured 
when they had to pay respondent substantially more for their goods than their com-
petitors had to pay." FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948). 
91 Even where unequal treatment actually places a greater financial burden on the 
non-favored buyer than he would otherwise have borne in handling the defendant's 
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porting an automatic damage award involves an inference of 
damage from the fact of a violation. A suspicion of damage is 
given the respectability of a finding of damage. In some cases this 
may be a legimate inference, subject to rebuttal by the defendant, 
for circumstantial evidence, so familiar in antitrust actions, can be 
very convincing. But the possibility of a legitimate inference of 
fact from circumstantial evidence is a matter of proof, individual 
to each case, and such a mere possibility should not be elevated to 
the dignity of a general proposition or concept of damage. Such a 
"concept" of damage does not represent any independent category 
of damage; it is simply an inarticulate reference to every type of 
damage previously discussed. Moreover, insofar as "automatic 
damages" are thought to restore "equality," the effect of the 
trebling provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act is completely 
ignored. The former beneficiary of a discrimination, who may well 
have been quite innocent of any ·wrongdoing, would become its 
inadvertent victim.92 
In any event, the great weight of authority indicates that the 
goods, this "greater burden" is an effect (in the form of increased buying or operating 
costs) which requires proof. It should not be inferred simply from an inequality of 
treatment. 
~2 See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 997 (8th Cir.) 
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court's cele-
brated dictum in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947), 
that a plaintiff "would establish its right to recover three times the discriminatory 
difference without proving more than the illegality of the prices," remains a bit em-
barrassing; but even as dictum it would not seem to have been carefully considered 
by the Court. The issue before the Court, whether a Robinson-Patman Act violation 
could be raised as a defense to an action on notes representing indebtedness for goods 
delivered, had a difficult history. The state trial court had denied the defense. The 
Florida Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-two decision, and then on rehearing, in a 
four-to-three decision (without opinion), held that the defense was not available on 
the facts in evidence. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 So. 2d 
461 (1945). The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court without 
opinion, 327 U.S. 758 (1946), granted a rehearing, 327 U.S. 812 (1946), and then 
reaffirmed in an eight-to-one decision, 330 U.S. 743 (1947). The petitioner's argument 
before the Supreme Court was essentially that it had been charged an unlawfully dis-
criminatory price over and above the fair value of cans purchased, that it had paid 
the fair value of the cans, that the amount remaining due on its notes represented 
the amount by which it had been overcharged, and hence that the notes could not 
be collected by legal action. 330 U.S. 743, 748, 758-59. The Court rejected this argu-
ment on the ground that petitioner was attempting to measure its injury by the amount 
of credit it received, rather than by the injury sustained. 330 U.S. 743, 753. In light 
of petitioner's argument the Court's dictum makes sense. See Enterprise Indus. v. The 
Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). But in light of 
statements made by the Court at 330 U.S. 743, 746, 753, the dictum seems ill-considered 
nonetheless. 
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view favoring "automatic" damages has been rejected.93 For that 
view runs counter to the cases requiring proof of "special dam-
ages,"94 requiring that plaintiff prove with certainty95 the fact that 
defendant's violation did cause some economic loss in his business,96 
and denying recovery of d~mages representing a windfall.07 It 
ignores the realiti~s of market effects and represents a serious lack 
of understanding of the nature of, and the difference between, 
direct and indirect forms of damage resulting from price dis-
crimination. Finally, it ignores the difference between proof of 
violation and proof of damage,08 and contradicts the cases which 
indicate that proof of violation does not establish damage.90 
B. General Damages 
A somewhat stronger case can be made for an award where the 
existence and cause of damage have been shown, and the plaintiff 
is then permitted to measure his damage by the amount of the 
discrimination involved. This type of award may be conveniently 
93 In Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 583 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 734 (1945), the court stated: "[I]n an action [under the Interstate Commerce Act] 
to recover a freight overcharge • • . the amount of damages recoverable is fixed or is at 
least susceptible of being made certain by mathematical calculations, and hence, they 
are liquidated damages. On the other hand, an action to recover treble damages under 
the Clayton Act is based upon tort and the amount of compensatory damages which 
may be recovered cannot be determined and is not fixed by statutory provisions, but 
the damages are unliquidated." But see Clark, supra note 67, at 406-11. 
94 See cases cited note 11 supra. 
95 See cases cited note 7 supra. 
96 See Keogh v. Chicago No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Miller Motors v. Ford 
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th 
Cir. 1955); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 
747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 
171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959); Banana Distribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959). See also cases 
cited note 28 supra. 
97 See cases cited note 8 supra. 
98 See Keogh v. Chicago No. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Miller Motors v. Ford 
Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958); Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 
457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony• 
Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports 
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); 
Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1959); Banana Dis• 
tribs. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 269 
F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469, afj'd, 172 
F .2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948). 
99 See cases cited notes 11, 29 supra. 
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-though somewhat inaccurately-termed a "general damages" 
award.100 It can be argued that by their nature damages resulting 
from price discriminations are 'very difficult and at times impossi-
ble to prove, and that a refusal to award "general damages," at 
least where the plaintiff has shovm the actual existence of some 
damage but cannot prove the amount of damages, runs counter to 
the policy of the antitrust laws. It may be said that by such a re-
fusal the private treble damage action will be rendered ineffective 
as an instrument of antitrust enforcement,101 the policy of com-
pensating persons injured by violations of the antitrust laws will 
be frustrated, and the victim rather than the wrongdoer will be 
required to bear the risk of the uncertainty created by the wrong-
doing. It can further be argued that an injunction is remedial 
rather than deterrent in effect, for while it causes unlawful conduct 
to be discontinued it does not prevent the original initiation of that 
conduct, and that such penalties as may exist, other than the dam-
age action, are not always sufficient to make unlawful conduct un-
profitable. The private treble damage action, on the other hand, 
100 The term "general damages," as it has been used in some price discrimination 
cases, is rather puzzling. Generally the term has significance with respect to the method 
of pleading rather than with respect to the method of proof. "General damages" 
usually designates damages which are commonly found to follow a specific type of wrong. 
Such damages need not be specifically pleaded, for defendants' attorneys know that 
damages in this class will be placed in issue. On the other hand, the term "special 
damages" usually denotes types of damage which are unusual or uncommon, and 
which must be specifically pleaded to give notice to the defendant that they will be 
placed in issue. The pleading significance of the terms was recognized by the court 
in Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 
1949). However, the term "general damages" has at times been used to imply an 
automatic damage recovery or to denote a measure of damages (the amount-of-discrimi-
nation formula). See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 
996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 703 (1945). This use of the term would appear 
to be both confusing and improper. First, it suggests that the amount of the discrimi-
nation in the usual case is itself damage, or is equivalent to the amount of damage. 
This, as we have seen, is at best a fiction, and items of general damage, while they 
need not be pleaded, must be proved as to amount just like items of special damage. 
A "damage" award which requires no proof of amount is in fact an award of punitive 
damages. The trebling provision of § 4 of the Clayton Act causes punitive damages 
to be awarded automatically once actual damages have been proved. It does not 
authorize an award of punitive damages in the first instance. Second, the distinction 
implied between "general damages" (as an automatic or semi-automatic damage award) 
and "special damages" (as items of loss specificially proved) is erroneous, for all ordi-
nary business losses are general damages. See, e.g., Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth 
Arden Sales Corp., supra at 153. 
101 See Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman 
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L REv. 181, 210-21 (1961), suggesting an automatic damage 
approach to effectuate the enforcement function of the treble damage action; the dis-
cussion is especially relevant to the "general damage" approach. 
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is not only remedial but deterrent in effect, for it makes violation a 
costly and unprofitable proposition. Consequently, if a defendant 
seller is permitted to escape liability for an injury shown to have 
been inflicted, disregard of Robinson-Patman Act provisions will 
not be discouraged and American business will thereby be de-
prived of a significant part of the protection which the Robinson-
Patman Act, in conjunction with section 4 of the Clayton Act, was 
intended to provide. 
It can also be argued that plaintiff has been hurt because he was 
not treated equally with favored buyers (this having been proved), 
that the result of the inequality in treatment was to leave plaintiff 
with a burden of expense which favored buyers did not have to 
bear, and that if plaintiff had received the same benefits that 
favored buyers received plaintiff would have been relieved of that 
unequal burden of expense. Hence, plaintiff's damage may be 
measured by the amount of the discrimination involved in a 
given case.102 
While these and other arguments are appealing in some cases, 
the better view would clearly seem to be that they must be rejected. 
A measure of damages, while it need not be precisely accurate, 
must be one calculated to produce reasonably accurate results-
it may not be arbitrary or speculative.103 A plaintiff may not 
simply prove a violation and an injury and then recover auto-
matic or liquidated damages measured by the amount of the 
discrimination. A rational basis for estimating the amount of loss 
sustained in each individual case must be provided.104 
Consequently, the amount of the discrimination in a given case 
can be a valid measure of damages, but only if it is so related to the 
loss which it caused as to approximate the amount of that loss with 
reasonable accuracy. The entire preceding discussion, both as to 
the nature of damage and as to proof of damage, indicates that 
there is no necessary correlation between the amount of the dis-
crimination and the amount of loss resulting to a non-favored 
buyer, for the loss is generally caused indirectly and depends on 
competitive effects on sales volume which are influenced by many 
factors in addition to buying cost.105 Even where the loss is directly 
102 See generally Barber, supra note 101, at 210-21. 
103 See cases cited notes 33, 34 supra. 
10-1 See cases cited notes 11, 29, 34, 93 supra. 
105 It has been suggested that cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act arc 
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caused by the discrimination and is related to purchase volume (as 
in the case of an excessive charge) the necessary correlation may be 
lacking; absent discrimination the non-favored buyer (and all 
buyers) would perhaps seldom have received as great a benefit as 
favored buyers received during the period of discrimination, and 
such loss as the non-favored buyer did sustain may have been 
"passed on" in whole or in part. 
If a loss actually occurred and its existence can be proved, cer-
tainly a reasonable method or combination of methods for esti-
mating the amount of loss can be found among the variety of those 
available. It would seem that the difficulties private plaintiffs have 
had in recovering damages in private treble damage actions may be 
ascribed not so much to "impossible" proof requirements as to 
their own lack of understanding of what is involved in establishing 
a claim for treble damages. 
The arguments in favor of a "general damages" award and 
those in favor of an "automatic damages" award are largely the 
same, and it is difficult to separate the question of "general 
not relevant to actions under § 4 of the Clayton Act. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. 
v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 995-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945). This 
is true with respect to the freight overcharge cases where recovery is permitted without 
reference to whether the overcharges resulted in actual damage to the plaintiff. See 
note 71 supra. There seems to be no fundamental difference in principle between a 
cause of action under the Interstate Commerce Act and the basic cause of action under 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, however, where suit is for damages allegedly suffered as the 
result of the defendant's unlawful discrimination in pricing. In both cases the plaintiff 
claims that unequal treatment caused him to suffer loss, and in both cases plaintiff 
is permitted to recover only if he can prove that he did in fact suffer actual loss. 
Compare cases cited note 7, 11 supra, with cases cited note 78 supra. Consequently, 
principles discussed in actions under the Interstate Commerce Act for damages resulting 
from price discrimination, are relevant to the present discussion. See Enterprise Indus. 
v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 459-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). 
In ICC v. The United States, 289 U.S. 385 (1933), Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote at 389-90: 
"'Vhen discrimination and that alone is the gist of the offense, the difference between 
one rate and another is not the measure of the damages suffered by the shipper. • . . 
"Overcharge and discrimination have very different consequences, and must be kept 
distinct in thought. ,vhen the rate exacted of a shipper is excessive or unreasonable 
in and of itself, irrespective of the rate exacted of competitors, there may be recovery 
of the overcharge without other evidence of loss. . . . But a different measure of 
recovery is applicable 'where a party that has paid only the reasonable rate sues upon 
a discrimination because some other has paid less.' . • . Such a one is not to recover 
as of course a payment reasonable in amount for a service given and accepted. He is 
to recover the damages that he has suffered, which may be more than the preference 
or less . • • , but which, whether more or less, is something to be proved and not 
presumed. • • • The question is not how much better off the complainant would be 
today if it had paid a lower rate. The question is how much worse off it is because 
others have paid less.'' (Emphasis added.) 
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damages" from that of "automatic damages."106 Generally, when a 
plaintiff argues that he should be permitted to "measure" his 
damages -by the amount of the discrimination involved, he is ac-
tually seeking not only to measure damages but also to prove the 
existence of loss simply by showing the existence of a price or 
price-related discrimination.107 His complaint regarding the dif-
ficulty of proof of damages arises not because he cannot provide 
a basis for estimating the amount of damages, but because he 
cannot prove that he suffered any actual loss. In those cases 
where "general damages" have actually been awarded, the exist-
ence of actual loss appears to have been inferred from what 
seemed the apparent tendency of defendant's violation to injure 
the plaintiff. The decisions reveal no actual evidence that absent 
the unlawful discrimination plaintiff would have paid less for his 
goods than he did, that he would have had less operating expenses, 
or that he would have made more sales with an attendant increase 
in profits.108 In other words, aside from the fact that a discrimina-
tion occurred, there apparently was no evidence that plaintiff would 
have been better off financially absent the discrimination. Damages 
seem to have been awarded in those cases on the ground that having 
given a favor to one, defendant ought to have given an equal favor 
to all. Such reasoning supports a finding of violation by defendant 
but not a finding of actual economic loss suffered by plaintiff. Con-
sequently, those cases would not seem to be authority for a "general 
damages" award but for an "automatic damages" award. 
Finally, the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act 
indicates that Congress did not intend that damages should be 
awarded in the absence of specific proof. Prior to the passage of 
the Robinson-Patman Act, section 2 of the Senate bill contained 
the following subsection: 
"(e) For purposes of suit under section 4 of this Act, the 
measure of damages for any violation of this section shall, 
106 See note 100 supra. 
101 See, e.g., Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 965 (1957); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th 
Cir. 1951); Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1949); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
326 U.S. 773 (1945); State Wholesale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., Civil 
No. 56 C 418, N.D. Ill., May 31, 1961. 
10s See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., supra note 107; State Whole-
sale Grocers v. The Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., supra note 107. 
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where the fact of damage is shown, and in the absence of 
proof of greater damage, be presumed to be the pecuniary 
amount or equivalent of the prohibited discrimination, pay-
ment, or grant involved in such violation; limited, however-
" (I) Under subsections (a) and (b) above, by the volume 
of plaintiff's business in the goods concerned, and for the 
period of time concerned, in such violation; 
"(2) Under subsection (c) above, to the amount or share, 
or its pecuniary equivalent, to which plaintiff would have 
been entitled if the payment concerned in such violation had 
been made or offered on proportionally equal terms to all 
customers competing in distribution of such products."109 
This provision was entirely omitted from the final version of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, indicating at the very least a deliberate 
refusal by Congress to authorize such a measure of damages.U0 
The House Conference Committee Report explained: 
"Subsection (e) of the Senate bill set up a new measure 
of damages for violations of the law, whereas the House bill 
left the damages to be determined in accordance with the pro-
visions of the existing Clayton Act. The Senate receded."m 
It might make sense, in answer to the above arguments, for 
Congress to authorize an automatic recovery based on the amount 
of the discrimination in a given case, in lieu of a treble damage 
recovery under section 4 of the Clayton Act. Such an automatic 
recovery would be in the nature of specific performance of the 
defendant's statutory obligation to accord equality. Congress has 
not authorized such a recovery, however, nor has it authorized sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act to be used as an "equalization proceed-
ing," which would only multiply inequalities in second-line com-
petition by giving the plaintiff three times the advantage formerly 
given a favored competitor. 
It is not the function of the judiciary to rewrite antitrust dam-
age law contrary to apparent congressional intent in an effort to 
provide more effective enforcement of the antitrust laws and to 
100 S. 3154, 7•ith Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). 
110 See Clark, supra note 67, at 406-07; 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 329, 331-33 (1957). 
111 H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). The attempt made in Eliza-
beth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 
U.S. 773 (1945), to explain away this fact of legislative history, is not convincing. See 
Enterprise Indus. v. The Tex. Co., 240 F.2d 457, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 
965 (1957); 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 329 (1957). 
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"compensate" private plaintiffs who find it difficult to show that 
they have been hurt.112 If antitrust remedies presently available 
are not sufficiently effective to enforce the antitrust laws Congress 
should provide more effective measures, but until it sees fit to do 
so, the judiciary should operate within the confines of those 
remedies presently authorized. 
Richard A. Miller, S.Ed. 
112 Id. at 333. 
